BGP leak in Iran impacts 20,000+ routes
Beginning at 13:36 UTC, TIC (AS49666) leaked over 20,000 prefixes learned from Telecom Armenia (AS12297) through TIC’s transit provider Asympto Networks (AS39533).
The incident was resolved after 20 minutes but not before misdirecting internet traffic from a number of countries including Russian, Australia, Azerbaijan, Great Britain and Germany.
This route leak coincided with (and may have been the cause of) a large internet disruption in Iran that was first reported by Filterbaan using the IODA dashboard.
Doug Madory is the director of internet analysis for Kentik where he works on internet infrastructure analysis. The Washington Post dubbed him “The Man who can see the Internet” for his reputation in identifying significant developments in the global layout of the internet. Doug is regularly quoted by major news outlets about developments ranging from national blackouts to BGP hijacks to the activation of submarine cables. Prior to Kentik, he was the lead analyst for Oracle’s internet intelligence team (formerly Dyn Research and Renesys).
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